The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was supposed to revolutionize the U.S. Navy – a change-maker for sure. The vessel itself was designed to perform a wide variety of tasks near the shore quickly and smoothly. However, it did not take too long before the reversed idea turned the Navy’s most questioned and scrutinized programs, with problems like schedule delay, budget blowouts, and technical setbacks the Navy suffered.
After the Cold War, the Navy had to come up with new approaches to tricky problems. Big battleships and aircraft carriers, for example, were no longer the best options for coastal waters (the “littorals”). A ship was needed to accomplish the task faster in smaller waters, and different crew members did not have to be trained for every new mission. So, based on those requirements, LCS was born: a multi-mission and modular ship capable of changing roles according to the Navy’s demand.
Although the idea was great, problems started emerging while building the actual ships. The Navy decided not to base the ships on just 1 design but adopted 2 concepts in rivalry conditions: one was Lockheed Martin’s Freedom-class, which included a conventional steel hull, and the other was General Dynamics/Austal’s Independence-class, which is made up of aluminum with a trimaran architecture. What exactly happened was that, although they wanted to get the most benefit from the technology and keep 2 or more shipyards active, the choice created a lot of extra matters in the way of complexity, confusion, and pecuniary cost.
The Littoral Combat Ship was to gain its modular systems as the chief advantage. Unfortunately, the mission packages had many obstacles, such as high prices, hard installation, technical snags, and they very often suffered from the problematic ships, in which the issues ranged from engine failure and leaking, and so they had to cut their journeys short and return to base. Since the teams were already in a tight spot, the routine maintenance that had become a part of their lives was always a hard fight, and frequently they had to bring in contractors for the job, which would cost them even more money. Line 18, Textual harmony check: kept original single sentence form, no content change, paraphrased.
Not surprisingly, the critics were quite outspoken. The program was branded by numerous watchdogs and analysts as a flop, as they argued the LCS vessels were grounded for maintenance more often than they were used for missions. Also, armed lightly, the ships would be an easy target if they encountered a serious threat.
Political influence was another factor that helped keep the program going. The politicians wanted it to live not only because it was good for the country but also for the sake of the jobs in their communities, and consequently, they would have a hard time getting re-elected.
At the same time, the corporate money would gladly wait for the call to come to their lobby and join forces with the politicians for the sake of more contracts and shared profit. The outcome was 33 vessels with a budget used of almost $100 billion, which would be enough to cover the Navy’s concerns, while at the same time, it would be only halfway through their plan.
In order to make the LCS more effective, the Navy has been installing the Naval Strike Missile and starting to use drones for surveillance. Though some officials are still praising the ships for their speed and scouting capabilities, it has been unable to fully erase the program’s muddled legacy with these improvements.
The moment the last Independence-class ship, named the USS Pierre, was handed over to the Navy, the latter announced that this chapter was over. Even if the LCS was not able to do everything it was originally designed for, it has been able to stretch naval concepts and operational perspectives in new terrain, hence testing such ideas as could be the basis of future programs.
On the one hand, the story of LCS is a clear instance of what occurs when grand plans come up against technical difficulties and political realities. It depicts how defense programs could be formed under the influence of a network of conflicting interests — from military leaders to contractors to elected officials — even when caution signals are visible. The learning of LCS as a case will most probably become a guiding light for future naval ventures on a less bumpy road.
Firstly, the Littoral Combat Ship may be famed not only for its performance but secondly quite a lot as a prime example of the confusing, unexpected situation of modern military innovation.
