When the war in Ukraine erupted, the world looked to Russia’s military—long regarded as a modern, invigorated force—to act with speed and vigor. Instead, it staggered. A series of expensive blunders quickly destroyed that reputation, and the war has become a laboratory, remaking not only Russia’s military but the way all militaries approach war in the 21st century.
Russia’s ground forces expanded rapidly as the war rolled on. But putting more men into the battle didn’t always succeed. Numerous fresh recruits had hardly any training, and there were chronic equipment shortages. Russia’s initial approach was to rely heavily on overwhelming Ukraine with sheer numbers. Eventually, however, Moscow began to learn lessons from its early mistakes. Undisciplined soldiers are now primarily deployed to occupy territory, while the best units—such as the marine infantry, airborne VDV, and Spetsnaz—are allocated improved training and equipment. These elite forces are growing rapidly. The Marines, for instance, are projected to increase from 20,000 to 75,000 troops.
In addition to that, a significant structural change has occurred. Russia is abandoning small, agile brigades in favor of larger divisions that can absorb more losses and continue fighting. It’s a change that speaks to the ruthless reality of this war, one where stamina and reserves tend to be more important than speed or agility.
Tanks, previously considered obsolete, have proven to be a necessity in the fight for territory. Both have lost massive numbers of tanks, with Russian tank losses alone having been reportedly over 8,000. Although production has picked up, much of what’s being produced in Russian factories is the older, refurbished tanks, some dating back to the Cold War. Newer T-90 tanks are still being constructed, but far too slowly. Consequently, most Russian troops are compelled to engage in battle using obsolete vehicles susceptible to contemporary attacks such as drones, mines, and insufficient air support.
That’s not to say that there has been no innovation. Russia has begun to use drones seriously, deploying them to monitor Ukrainian movements and guide artillery fire in real time. Electronic warfare troops have also become more sophisticated, jamming Ukrainian signals and interdicting drone operations more effectively. This shift has made it more difficult for Ukraine to coordinate an attack and represents a clear improvement from the beginning of the war.
The Russian air force, however, is still a weakness. Its planners and pilots continue to use old tactics, and equipment losses are difficult to make up for. Unlike Western air forces, which specialize in long-range strategic operations, Russian air capabilities are primarily geared to support ground troops. Even being larger than Ukraine’s, it was unable to destroy key infrastructure in the initial weeks of the invasion. Russia has resorted to long-range missile bombardments and Iranian drones to attack deep within Ukraine. They tend to depend on quantity to overwhelm defenses, more so than accuracy.
The Navy hasn’t fared so poorly either. In the Black Sea, Russia has lost ships, submarines, and even its fleet headquarters to Ukrainian attacks. Nevertheless, its naval might is far from shattered. Russia’s military prowess at sea is still strong in the Arctic and Pacific, where Ukrainian missiles can’t reach. Submarines are still a core component of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, and new ones continue to be constructed to build on that capability.
Behind it all is a war economy on full steam. Since the invasion started, Russia has almost doubled its defense budget to about $142 billion. It has used that money to have factories build more tanks, missiles, and artillery, but not fast enough to compensate for losses on the battlefield. West sanctions have put it in a more difficult position to procure the high-tech components it requires for cutting-edge weapons, so it’s turned to friends. Iran has provided drones and tactical missiles, China has contributed materials and electronics, and North Korea has sent artillery shells and short-range missiles—although the quality of those weapons is sometimes suspect.
Even with all these adaptations, Russia’s army still has far to go. Its command is more experienced now, and the structure is more cohesive. The overall strategy relies on old Russian strengths: deep defensive lines, long-range bombing, and enormous artillery barrages. But still, compared to NATO, the gap is enormous. NATO troops are better trained, better armed, and much more integrated. Their air power alone can cripple or shut down enemy operations within minutes.
For both Russia and the West, this war has been a wake-up call. It’s proven that large-scale conflict in today’s world depends not just on high-tech gear, but also on a steady supply of reliable, affordable weapons—and the logistics to keep them flowing. Russia has adapted in some ways, but the war has stripped away the illusion of its military might. The bigger concern now is what comes next. If the period is utilized by Russia to arm and rebuild, Russia could again overestimate its capability, laying the groundwork for even more deadly face-offs in the years to come.
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